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957 
HUMANS OF NEW YORK, 
 SHUT YOUR BLINDS 
Amanda DeFeo*  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The right of privacy has been called the most esteemed right 
of the civilized man.1  However, it is the civilized man who, with his 
intellect, has contributed to a social evolution that allows for the 
invasion of individual privacy.2  Today, invasive technologies allow 
for the disclosure of the sacred corners of domestic life.3  Due to 
societal  advancements, the law must keep pace with the changing 
times and the progress of the human mind.4  It has become essential 
to redefine the nature and extent of an individual’s protection of his 
or her personal privacy.5  Photographic technology, artistic trends, 
and cultural developments have raised several questions regarding the 
right of privacy.6  For example, the well-known project entitled 
Humans of New York has attracted over twenty million online 
 
*J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A in English 
Literature, Fordham University 2013. I would like to thank my parents for their 
overwhelming support and guidance throughout my law school career.  Mom and Dad, thank 
you for always believing in me. To my little sister Danielle, you are my inspiration.  Thank 
you to all the Touro faculty who assisted me with this Note.  Thank you to the Touro alumni, 
especially Bridgette Nunez and Ryan Nasim.  Finally, a very special thanks to Professor 
Rena Seplowitz. 
1  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
2 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193, 193 
(1890) [hereinafter Right to Privacy]. 
3 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 97-99 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).  
4 Right to Privacy, supra note 2; Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 106. 
5 Right to Privacy, supra note 2; See also Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 106 (explaining that “in 
these times of heightened threats to privacy posed by new and ever more invasive 
technologies, we call upon the legislature to revisit this important issue.”). 
6 The Privacy Panic Cycle, http://www2.itif.org/2015-privacy-panic.pdf (last visited Mar. 
4, 2017).  
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followers without violating New York Civil Rights Law.7  The 
Humans of New York project includes photographing random New 
Yorkers on the streets and posting their images on social media to 
create a catalog of New York residents and their stories.8  In contrast, 
the artist Arne Svenson and his project titled “The Neighbors” raised 
many questions regarding the scope of the New York Civil Rights 
Law, which provides the basis for the right of privacy.9  Many people 
would believe that circulating a photograph of a barely clothed child 
that was taken with a special lens through the window of the child’s 
home is an invasion of privacy.  Yet, as exemplified by this Note, this 
is not redressed under New York State law.10  Currently, unlike other 
states, New York State’s privacy statute is too narrow to encompass 
this type of conduct, which was challenged in Foster v. Svenson.11  
 
7 See HUMANS OF NEW YORK, http://www.humansofnewyork.com (last visited Mar. 4, 
2017); See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (“Any person whose name, 
portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes . . . without the 
written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the 
supreme court of this state.”).  In addition, New York Civil Rights Law section 50 provides 
that it is a misdemeanor for “a person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, 
or for the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having 
first obtained . . . written consent . . .” N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 50 (McKinney 2009). 
8 See HUMANS OF NEW YORK, supra note 7.  All individuals are aware their photo is being 
taken and give consent that it be published on social media. HUMANS OF NEW YORK, supra 
note 7.  
9 Eugene Volokh, NY Court Legal to Surreptitiously Photograph People in Their Homes, 
and Sell Those Photos, THE WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/10/n-y-court-legal-to-surreptitiously-photograph-
people-in-their-homes-and-sell-those-photos (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).  
10 Foster v. Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038 (2013) at *1 (“While it makes Plaintiffs cringe to 
think their private lives and images of their small children can find their way into the public 
forum of an art exhibition, there is no redress under the current laws of the State of New 
York.”). Id.  
11 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 105; Volokh, supra note 9.  
In most states photographing someone in their home with a telephoto lens would indeed be 
tortious, under the “intrusion upon seclusion” tort; as the Restatement notes,  
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
[Comment b:] The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in 
which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces 
his way into the plaintiff’s room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s 
objection in entering his home. It may also be by the use of the 
defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or 
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs 
windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wire.  
2
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This Note will discuss the tension between two fundamental 
freedoms: an individual’s right to privacy and “the touchstone of 
individual liberty”––the freedom of expression.12  Part II of this Note 
will discuss the facts and procedural background of Foster v. 
Svenson.  The Foster family alleged that their statutory right of 
privacy was violated when the highly acclaimed fine art 
photographer, Arne Svenson, published photographs of their barely 
clothed children.13  Svenson asserted that his photographs were 
constitutionally protected by his freedom of expression.14  Part III 
will discuss the decision of the First Department which immunized 
Svenson’s conduct, finding it beyond the reach of the privacy laws.15  
Part IV will examine the balancing test adopted by the federal courts, 
which balances the government’s interest in protecting an 
individual’s privacy against protecting freedom of expression.16  
Although the federal courts place a heavy weight on the sacrosanct 
freedom encompassed within the First Amendment,17 in each 
generation and each situation, the theory underlying an individual’s 
right to privacy and expression requires reevaluation.18  Part V will 
discuss the statutory right of privacy in New York Civil Rights Law 
sections 50 and 51.19  Mindful of the inherent tensions, the New York 
State legislature enacted a privacy statute, which is to be “narrowly 
construed and strictly limited to non-consensual commercial 
appropriations of the name, portrait or picture of a living person.”20  
However, by implementing such a narrow approach, New York State 
courts have failed to consider an equitable balance between free 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
12 5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 20.2. 
13 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).  
14 Id. 
15 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96. 
16 See discussion infra Part IV. 
17 See discussion infra Part IV. 
18 T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 894 
(1929) [hereinafter General Theory of the First Amendment]. 
19 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (“Any person whose name, 
portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes . . . without the 
written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the 
supreme court of this state.”).  In addition, New York Civil Rights Law section 50 provides 
that it is a misdemeanor for “a person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, 
or for the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having 
first obtained . . . written consent . . . .” N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009). 
20 Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038, *1 (2013). 
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speech and privacy on multiple occasions.  This failure is exemplified 
in the case of Foster v. Svenson, where the Appellate Division 
considered whether the New York Civil Rights Law granted an 
individual the right to prohibit a photographer from displaying his 
photographs in art galleries or whether the First Amendment instead 
allowed unlimited dissemination of such image.21  To grant an artist 
such broad First Amendment protection is to essentially eliminate the 
right of privacy.22  Thus, approximately one month following the 
decision, a bill, which is currently pending, was introduced in the 
New York State Assembly to amend the New York Civil Rights Law 
to prohibit conduct such as taking photographs of a person within the 
confines of his or her home where there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.23  This Note will argue that in order to deal with the 
increasing threat to an individual’s privacy evidenced in Foster v. 
Svenson, this amendment to the New York privacy statute should be 
enacted.24  By adopting this amendment, the legislature would strike 
a balance between the interests of an artist’s freedom of expression 
and the invasion of an individual’s right of privacy within his or her 
home. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF                   
FOSTER V. SVENSON 
Martha and Matthew Foster brought a suit on behalf of their 
children when they learned through various media coverage that the 
defendant, Arne Svenson, had been secretly snapping photographs of 
three-year-old Delaney Foster and one-year-old James Foster from 
behind the curtains of his own apartment and displaying and selling 
the images to the public.25  Svenson, an artist noted for his eerie and 
eccentric photography, embarked on a yearlong project in which he 
hid in the shadows of his darkened apartment, and waited for his 
neighbors to appear in the window.26  He used a high powered 
 
21 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96. 
22 Id. at 102. “To give absolute protection to all expressive works would be to eliminate 
the statutory right of privacy.” Id. 
23 Bill A. 07804, S. 0583. 
24 Bill A. 07804, S. 0583. 
25 Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038 at *1 (2013). 
26 Id. 
4
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camera that was originally used for capturing images of birds.27  The 
floor to ceiling windowpanes of the neighboring building naturally 
framed the focal point of Svenson’s still-life exhibit entitled “The 
Neighbors.”28  Svenson’s images captured intimate family activities 
of several tenants residing at 475 Greenwich Street.29  The residents 
were unaware they were being photographed while they were 
watching television, completing household tasks, and enjoying a meal 
at their dinner table.30  
There is no dispute that Svenson took the series of 
photographs without consent.31  Nevertheless, the photographs were 
exhibited in galleries in Los Angeles and New York, on gallery 
websites, as well as Svenson’s personal website.32  When Mrs. Foster 
discovered a photograph which displayed James barely clothed, and a 
photograph which displayed Delaney in a bathing suit, she 
telephoned Svenson demanding removal of the pictures from every 
forum.33  Svenson, acknowledging the photographs may invite a 
question of privacy, agreed to stop showing and selling the 
photograph of James.34  However, he refused to do so with respect to 
the photograph of Delaney.35  Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs. Foster 
retained counsel who sent cease and desist letters to the defendant, 
galleries, and websites, demanding removal of the photographs of the 
Foster children.36  The defendant, galleries, and websites all 
complied.37  
Notwithstanding the Fosters’ efforts, a photograph of Delaney 




29 Complaint at 17; Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. The photographs were offered for sale for between $5,000 and $7,500 by an online 
art gallery called “Artsy.net.” Id. 
33 Complaint at 17; Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 
34 Raffi Khatchadourian, Stakeout, The New Yorker (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/27/stakeout (explaining how Svenson 
consulted with his lawyer prior to the commencement of this action when he was told, “In a 
city where people are so tightly crammed together, there is a scant presumption of 
privacy.”). 
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broadcasts, including NBC’s “TODAY Show,” where the Fosters’ 
building address was revealed and Delaney’s face was clearly 
recognizable.38  Concerned with their children’s safety, the Fosters 
immediately sued Svenson seeking injunctive relief pursuant to New 
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51, which grants such right to 
an individual whose name or likeness is used without consent for 
commercial advantage.39  
In opposition to the motion for injunctive relief and cross-
motion to dismiss the complaint, Svenson claimed exclusive 
proprietary rights to the photographs.40  Svenson asserted that the 
First Amendment’s freedom of expression protected his artwork.41  
Bolstering this claim was the extensive critical acclamation from the 
artistic community regarding Svenson’s creative work.42  The artistic 
community likened Svenson’s photographs to other famous 
“surveillance photography” that may have challenged an individual’s 
privacy yet were viewed as creative expressive works.43  Counsel for 
Svenson pointed out other renowned artists and photographers such 
as Andre Kertesz, Michael Wolf, and Cartier-Bresson who have 
similarly photographed individuals through windows, but whose 
actions have not been challenged.44  According to the artistic 
community, Svenson’s work was an intellectual and artistic 
masterpiece that compelled society to consider central issues such as 
the societal boundary lines that divide the public from the private 
through the use of his photographs.45  
 
38 Id.  
39  See supra note 19 (The Fosters only sued Svenson individually; they did not sue the 
news stations or the websites that displayed the images.). 
40 Brief of Plaintiff at 17.  Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 
41 Brief of Defendant at 17, Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 
42 Brian Boucher, ARNE SVENSON BASKS IN COURT VICTORY, (Aug. 16, 2013) 
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/arne-svenson-basks-in-court-
victory/. 
43 Id. See also Rena Silverman, ANDRE KERTESZ WATCHING FROM ABOVE, (May 4, 2015), 
http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/andr-kertsz-watching-from-above (explaining the 
career of the artist Andre Kertesz and his experience and success with surveillance 
photography). 
44 Id.  
45 See THE NEIGHBORS, http://mcadenver.org/arnesvenson.php, (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) 
(“Capturing the lives of his neighbors (their habits, activities, tastes) over the course of a 
year, Svenson also used the geometry of the buildings’ windows as his frame, creating 
various tableaux of domestic life unfolding. Presenting over 20 photographs from this series, 
The Neighbors, this exhibition explores in depth the central issues raised by these enigmatic 
6
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The Supreme Court of New York County held that the New 
York and Federal constitutions granted Svenson the freedom to 
display his photographs and thus the New York Civil Rights Law 
Section 51 did not apply.46  The court rejected the Fosters’ 
application for a preliminary injunction and granted Svenson’s 
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to show a likelihood of 
success based on sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights 
Law.47  The court considered whether Svenson’s use of the 
photographs qualified as the kind of commercial appropriation that 
the statute prohibited, and found that the photographs served to 
promote artistic creation rather than commercial gain.48  The court 
held that the First Amendment shields Svenson’s photographs from 
the reach of New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.49  The 
court stated, “Art is considered free speech … visual art is as wide 
ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, 
treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full 
First Amendment protection.”50 
III. THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S DECISION 
On appeal, the Appellate Division for the First Department 
affirmed the decision of the New York County Supreme Court to 
grant Svenson’s motion to dismiss the complaint.51  The Appellate 
Division analyzed the legislature’s intent to protect the rights 
prescribed by the First Amendment.52  To preserve legislative intent, 
the court recognized two fundamental principles.  First, the statute 
 
works: voyeurism, the increasingly imperceptible boundaries between privacy and the 
public, and the ubiquity of the camera in our surveillance-obsessed world.”). Id.  
46 Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038 at *1 (2013). 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
52 See General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 18, at 894 (“The values sought 
by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression may be grouped into four broad 
categories. Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring 
individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing 
participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decision-making, 
and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society.”). Id.  
7
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prevents the commercial exploitation of an individual’s likeness.53  
Second, the court held that the statute does not apply to any form of 
information which is considered newsworthy.54  Since public interest 
is deemed essential, the court granted extensive leeway in classifying 
newsworthy speech.55  The court held that newsworthiness extends to 
social trends, consumer reports, and political activities.56  The court 
concluded that newsworthiness also applies to modes of artistic 
expression because they serve to provide aesthetic value to society 
and thus deserve to be disseminated in light of societal interests.57 
However, the court noted that to grant an unconditional right 
to disseminate all forms of newsworthy speech would eliminate 
privacy laws altogether.58  The court explored two limits of the 
newsworthy exception and described two tests to determine when the 
defendant’s publication of a photograph should be classified as 
newsworthy speech: 1) the “advertisement in disguise” test; and 2) 
the “no relationship” test.59  Therefore, if the court found Svenson’s 
photographs fell within one of the two limitations, his claim of 
newsworthiness would fail. 
The first limitation to the newsworthy exception is the 
“advertisement in disguise” test, which applies to an image used 
primarily for a commercial purpose.  The test asks whether an 
advertisement is being disguised as a non-commercial publication or 
whether the fundamental function is a commercial purposes.60  The 
court cited Beverley v. Women’s Med. Ctr., which held that the 
defendant could not claim the newsworthy and public concern 
exception to escape the reach of the statute when the plaintiff’s 
photograph was used in a calendar that was strictly meant to be an 
advertisement to promote sales of such calendars.61  The images of 
the Foster children aided in promoting Svenson’s work and in turn 
 
53 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96; see General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 18. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96. 
60 Id. 
61 See Beverley v. Women’s Med. Ctr., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1991) (explaining that 
the image displayed in the calendar was mistakenly used for a commercial purpose and 
therefore was not incidental). 
8
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produced revenue.  Generally, art is created to be offered for sale.  
However, the court did not apply this “advertisement in disguise” 
limitation.  The court said that even though profit may have been 
derived from the sale of the images, such profit does not diminish the 
constitutional protections afforded to them under the First 
Amendment.62 
The second limitation of the newsworthy exception is the “no 
real relationship test.”63  To demonstrate when to apply the test, the 
court cited Murray v. New York Mag. Co., where the defendant used 
the plaintiff’s photograph to supplement his article regarding the sale 
of drugs to which the plaintiff had absolutely no connection.64  The 
New York Court of Appeals in Murray set forth a test, which states 
that if there is no relationship between the publication and the 
accompanying photograph, then it is implied that the image’s only 
purpose is to encourage the sale of the publication.  In the case of The 
Neighbors, the newsworthy exception to the statute does not apply.65  
Most pictures in The Neighbors exhibit are aesthetically pleasing and 
fit into the general theme of capturing unanticipated moments in 
human life.66  Notwithstanding the fact that the Fosters had absolutely 
no real or personal relationship to The Neighbors exhibit, the court 
did not apply this limitation; rather, it applied the newsworthy and 
public concern exception. 67  The court rejected the Fosters’ 
allegations and declined to adopt either of the limitations to the 
newsworthy exception.68   
The court found that the photographs were artistic expressions 
in the form of artwork and therefore a public interest.  The very 
function of the newsworthy and public concern exception is to afford 
First Amendment protection to works of art.69  The court reasoned 
 
62 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96. 
63 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96. 
64 267 N.E.2d 256 (N.Y. 2010). 
65 Id. 
66 Supra note 45. 
67 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 103 (“Similarly, when a court determines that there is no real 
relationship between the use of the plaintiff’s name or picture and the article it is used to 
illustrate, the defendant cannot use the newsworthy and public concern exception as a 
defense . . . . Applying the newsworthy and public concern exemption to the complaint 
herein, we conclude that the allegations do not sufficiently plead a cause of action under the 
statutory tort of invasion of privacy.”). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 100. 
9
Defeo: Humans of New York
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
966 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
 
that the images themselves constitute a work of art, and the 
advertising and sale of the photographs were encouraged in this 
case.70  However, the court also noted that no question was presented 
as to whether a particular photograph should be considered a work of 
art.  Svenson’s ability to sell photographs of the Fosters’ likenesses 
and call them “art” is the fundamental issue in this case.   For 
example, New York’s Civil Rights Law expressly prohibits the sale 
of a person’s image for the use of advertising or trade without his or 
her consent.  But, the court stated, “part of the protection of free 
speech is the right to disseminate the ‘speech,’ and that includes 
selling it.”71  This conclusion assumes that Svenson’s photographs 
are in fact “art.”  However, consider the following: How close to the 
Fosters’ home could Svenson place his camera before his 
photographs cross the fine line between “art” and “intrusion”?  What 
if Svenson used a camera with night vision capability to capture 
images at night?  These inquiries highlight the fact that the current 
law does not address rising privacy concerns.  To resolve this issue, 
the court was obliged to rely heavily on legislative history and case 
law72 but ultimately observed that the case’s specific facts prompt 
attention from the Legislature.  The court stated:  
To be sure, by our holding here—finding no viable 
cause of action for violation of the statutory right to 
privacy under these facts—we do not, in any way, 
mean to give short shrift to plaintiffs’ concerns.  
Undoubtedly, like plaintiffs, many people would be 
rightfully offended by the intrusive manner in which 
the photographs were taken in this case.  However, 
such complaints are best addressed to the Legislature 
the body empowered to remedy such inequities.73 
The current structure of New York’s privacy law does not cover the 
issues that have arisen in the past few decades in the world of 
photography.  The traditional rationale the legislature relied upon to 
enact the privacy law is strictly limited to unauthorized commercial 
use of a person’s image.  However, in Foster v. Svenson, the issue is 
 
70 Id.  
71 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 103 (quoting Simeonov, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1993)). 
72 See supra Part I (explaining the basis for the right of privacy).   
73 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 106.  
10
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not the commercial use of the photographs but rather the way in 
which the photographs were taken.  This course of action infringed 
upon the reasonable expectation of privacy within one’s home.  The 
photographs were advertised, sold for profit, and obtained without 
consent, yet the court found that Svenson’s photographs were not 
used for “advertising purposes” or for the purposes of “trade” under 
the meaning of the statute.74  The court mentioned the absence of 
legal authority regarding the holding.  The court explained, “We are 
constrained to find that the invasion of privacy of one’s home that 
took place here is not actionable . . . pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of 
the Civil Rights Law. . . [W]e are constrained to apply the law as it 
exists.”75  In other words, the court was obliged, forced or compelled 
to find that the “troubling facts” in Foster v. Svenson did not fall 
under the protection of New York’s narrow statutory right of 
privacy.76  The conduct in Foster v. Svenson raises both social and 
legal issues that should now be addressed by the New York courts or 
the legislature. 
IV. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states 
in pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”77  Federal courts have 
consistently favored granting broad First Amendment protection to 
preserve the essential liberty of a free nation.78  The First Amendment 
grants the freedom of expression to advance knowledge of society 
and discover truth.79  However, the directive to make no law 
“abridging the freedom of speech” is not absolute or without 
exceptions.80  Federal courts engage in a balancing test to determine 
 
74 Id. 
75 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 98 (emphasis added). 
76 Id. at 106 (emphasis added). 
77 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The New York State Constitution upholds with more specificity 
the same fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States.  The New 
York State Constitution provides, “Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his or 
her sentiments on all subjects . . . and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty 
of speech or of the press.” N.Y. CONST., art. I § 8. 
78 See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 
(1967); Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
79 See General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 18. 
80 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 151-52 (1765-1769).  
11
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the scope of the First Amendment by evaluating freedom of speech 
versus other compelling individual rights such as the right of 
privacy.81  According to the federal courts, art is considered protected 
speech because it conveys ideas and emotions by transcending the 
boundaries of language and culture.82  Art is a classic form of speech 
and a core value that is entitled to First Amendment protection.83  The 
federal court has taken the position that “the First Amendment 
doctrine does not disfavor nontraditional media of expression,” like 
modern art, but “protects all forms of peaceful expression.”84  Thus, 
if a photograph is deemed an artistic expression, it is entitled to the 
First Amendment’s protection.85  However, this traditional legal 
precedent is called into question by our society when a photograph is 
considered an artistic expression and simultaneously an invasion of 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
When a constitutional provision and a statute conflict, the 
court is obligated to exercise its judicial review.86  In order for the 
New York privacy statute to limit the power of First Amendment 
rights, the court must interpret the statute under strict scrutiny and 
find that the limit is narrowly tailored to preserve a compelling state 
interest.87  According to the federal courts, there is a compelling state 
interest to provide society with a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and unwanted intrusions within a person’s home.88  However, federal 
courts have also held that newsworthy or public interest speech 
transcends statutory privacy rights.89  The general rule is that the 
government should not restrict speech if it is related to suppression of 
free expression.90  Therefore, when a photograph invades an 
 
81 5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 20.7 (b) (1) (2014). 
82 Id.  
83 Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 350.  
84 Id. at 352. 
85 Id. 
86 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (granting the Supreme Court the 
power of judicial review). 
87 5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 16.1 (d) (2015). 
88 Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 348.  
89 Id. “[P]ure first amendment speech in the form of artistic expression . . . deserves full 
protection, even against . . . statutorily-protected privacy interests.” Id. 
90 5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 16.1 (d) (“The general rule is that the government may 
restrict speech if it meets a four part test: (1) if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; (3) if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the 
12
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individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the federal courts will 
favor the freedom of expression.91  The federal courts have 
mentioned three compelling state interests, which weigh heavily in 
favor of the freedom of expression that is granted by the First 
Amendment.92 
One compelling interest which justifies the broad freedom of 
expression is the circulation of news and information.  The United 
States Supreme Court, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, represents 
the majority’s interpretation of the First Amendment that individual 
privacy fades when publicly known information is reported as 
news.93  The Court in Cox held that the press is free to disseminate 
public information that is already part of the public domain.    
In Cox Broadcasting Corp, defendant Wassell was employed 
as a news reporter whose sole function was to investigate 
newsworthy events and subsequently televise them.94  The rape and 
murder of seventeen-year-old Cynthia Cohn was the topic of his next 
report.95  In order to gain information for the news report, Wassell 
personally attended the criminal trial.96  During the court recess, 
Wassell approached the court clerk and requested a copy of the 
murder and rape indictments that listed the name and identity of the 
victim.97  The court did not dispute that this information gathered was 
public knowledge.98  However, Mr. Cohn, the victim’s father, filed 
this action when he learned the local television station had released 
personal information including the name of his daughter and the 
details of the incident.99  The father was appalled to find that the 
 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest.”). 
91 Id. 
92 See supra section IV for a full discussion of federal compelling state interests. 
93 Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98  Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469. 
99 Id.  The televised report stated, “Six youths went on trial today for the murder-rape of a 
teenaged girl. ‘The six Sandy Springs High School boys were charged with murder and rape 
in the death of seventeen-year-old Cynthia Cohn following a drinking party last August 18th. 
The tragic death of the high school girl shocked the entire Sandy Springs community. Today 
the six boys had their day in court.” Id. at 475. 
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name of his daughter was released to the public via a local station and 
that he knew many of the viewers.  
The procedural history of the Cox case emphasizes the two 
opposing arguments regarding the specific issue of protecting 
information that is already public.  In the trial court, the broadcasting 
company argued that the broadcast should be protected under the 
First Amendment’s freedom of speech.100  The court rejected the 
argument and granted summary judgment in favor of the father based 
on a criminal statute.101  On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court 
agreed with the trial court’s holding that the First Amendment did not 
automatically protect the defendant because “the rights guaranteed by 
the First Amendment do not totally abrogate the right of privacy.”102  
The court found that the trial court erred in applying the criminal 
statute to a civil case, and instead found that the relevant cause of 
action was invasion of privacy: the tort of public disclosure.103  The 
court also found that summary judgment was improper because a 
question of fact remained as to whether the publication actually 
invaded the father’s “zone of privacy.”104  Thus, on the motion for 
rehearing before the Georgia Supreme Court to determine the privacy 
issue, the broadcasting company asserted the newsworthy exception, 
but the court denied it.105  As a matter of policy, the court relied on 
the statute as an authoritative declaration that the name of a rape 
victim is not a matter of public interest even though it was public 
knowledge at the court proceedings.106  The court balanced the 
government’s interest of protecting a father’s invasion of privacy 
against protecting the freedom of speech.  The Georgia Supreme 
Court found in favor of the father’s right of privacy and held that the 
statute was a limitation of the freedom of speech.107  This reasoning 
supports the position that despite the public nature of the 
photographs, the Fosters should be protected by the privacy statute as 
a matter of public policy.  Nevertheless, the United States Supreme 
 
100 Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 475 (citing Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541 (1971)). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 




Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/13
2017 HUMANS OF NEW YORK 971 
 
Court reversed the decision in Cox.108  The Court reasoned that the 
facts in Cox did not permit the state to protect the father’s right of 
privacy.109  The Court conceded “there is a zone of privacy 
surrounding every individual . . . where the state may protect him 
from intrusion by the press.”110  This zone of privacy should prevail 
when the press oversteps its rights by publishing private 
information.111  In such situations, the Court stated there should be a 
remedy for such alleged abuses.112  However, the Court concluded 
that the facts in Cox did not merit the protection since the information 
was a matter of public record.113  Similarly, it can be argued that the 
Fosters’ zone of privacy within their home was relinquished when 
they opened the blinds, which subjected them to the intrusion of the 
press. 
This discussion begs for answers to the fundamental questions 
regarding the Fosters’ right of privacy--Why did the Fosters fail to 
shut their blinds if they did not want the public gazing inside the 
windows of their apartment?  Similar to the information in Cox that 
was already public knowledge, the opened blinds subjected the 
Fosters to neighboring eyes of the public.  Further, did the Fosters 
waive their expectation of privacy by keeping their blinds open?  
Even if the Fosters assumed the public could gaze inside their 
apartment windows, did they expect anyone would be taking pictures 
of their children getting dressed?  Even if people could reasonably 
gaze into an apartment, people would generally not expect that their 
image would be captured.  Was this degree of intrusion reasonable?  
Moreover, did the Fosters expect anyone to share those pictures with 
the public?  The Restatement (First) of Torts states that in a privacy 
action, liability is measured by the defendant’s conduct and whether 
he should have realized that his conduct would be offensive to 
persons of ordinary sensibilities.114  It is only where the defendant’s 
intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability 




110 Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 487. 
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939). 
115 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 207 (2012).  
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themselves open to the possibility of someone looking in from the 
outside.  However, very few New York City residents would 
reasonably expect that a camera lens is capable of capturing the 
subjects inside the window of a four-story apartment building.116  The 
reasonable expectation of privacy should not disappear simply 
because the fourth-story window is open.  It would be an improper 
extension of this argument to conclude that the Fosters subjected 
themselves to having their picture taken and published to the public.  
The Fosters expected that no one would take their photo even if the 
blinds were open.  Nevertheless, even if we concede that Svenson 
rightfully obtained the photographs since the Fosters’ blinds were 
open, the question then becomes -- Was what Svenson proceeded to 
do with the photographs permitted under the law? 
The federal courts’ general position is the following: if the 
information that is being published gives further publicity to 
information that is already part of the public domain, the court will 
not impose liability.117  Further, the Court in Cox emphasized the 
government’s responsibility to provide society with informative news 
coverage of matters regarding legitimate public concerns and found 
that the facts presented fell within the public’s concern.118  Therefore, 
federal courts encourage the spread of information, news, and media 
that are already public knowledge.119  Whether Svenson’s images of 
the Fosters represent information that was already part of the public 
domain is one question that does not seem to have a clear answer.  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Cox which granted First 
Amendment protection is distinguishable from the holding in 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard, which did not grant First Amendment 
protection.120  Two years after Cox, the United States Supreme Court 
in the seminal case, Zacchini, revisited the issue in Cox and held that 
the protection of an individual’s privacy from intrusion of the press is 
 
116 Complaint at 3 (The Fosters live on the fourth floor of a modern building composed of 
glass walls located in Tribeca.  Svenson lives in a second-floor loft located across the 
street.).   
117 See infra Part V. 
118 Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 494.  
119 Id. 
120 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977); Compare Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. 494, with Zacchini, 
422 U.S. at 574. 
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itself a compelling state interest.121  The right of privacy includes the 
right to prohibit a person from using an individual’s name or likeness 
for commercial gain, known as the right of publicity.  The benefit 
from the use of a person’s proprietary interest in his or her own 
image may be given with consent.122  However, in Zacchini, the 
plaintiff did not grant that consent.  Therefore, plaintiff brought an 
action against the broadcasting company for violating his right of 
publicity by recording and airing the entire performance of a human 
cannon ball stunt on television.123  Although the plaintiff did not want 
his stunt to be aired to the public,  the broadcasting company 
recorded and aired the entire performance.124  The performance held 
personal value to the plaintiff because it reflected his hard work and 
was to remain only within the family.125  By airing the entire 
performance on television, the broadcasting company reduced the 
incentive for viewers to watch the plaintiff’s act live and thus 
inhibited the plaintiff’s ability to earn his livelihood.  The trial court 
granted the broadcaster’s summary judgment motion.126  On appeal, 
the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of the 
plaintiff’s right to protect his performance from being shown on the 
air.127  Subsequently, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on First 
Amendment grounds.128  The court found that “entertainment, as well 
as news, enjoys First Amendment protection” and neither the public 
nor the plaintiff will be deprived of this benefit so long as the 
plaintiff receives adequate compensation.  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether the First Amendment diluted the right of publicity when the 
speech concerns matters of public interest.129  Balancing the 
 
121 Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). (“There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as 
news, enjoys First Amendment protection.”); See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is 
not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.”). 
122 Id. 





128 Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 567.  Zacchini deals specifically with the tort of the right of 
publicity, which is one of the four branches within the right of privacy. Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 
2855. 
129 Id.  
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government’s dual interests, the Court in Zacchini held the scale 
tipped in favor of the right of publicity.  The Court did not dispute 
that the First Amendment granted wide-ranging permission to report 
on matters of public interest that may in turn invade a person’s realm 
of personal privacy.130  However, the Court’s holding was based on 
the policy behind the right of privacy, which is closely analogous to 
the goals of patent and copyright law.131  In cases of entertainers, 
there is usually no objection to the broadcasting of a performance so 
long as the entertainer is compensated.132  The policy behind the right 
of publicity according to the Court has little to do with protecting 
feelings or reputation, but is more concerned with protecting a 
proprietary interest of the individual and rewarding him for his 
endeavors.133  The Court stated, “We are quite sure that the First 
Amendment . . . do[es] not immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer’s entire act without his consent.”134   
Similar to the reporter in Zacchini, Svenson displayed the 
Fosters’ images in several museums, which in turn furthered his 
career, and resulted in increased attention from the media and 
certainly compensation.  Furthermore, the Fosters were not paid to be 
subjects of The Neighbors exhibit.  When one party is enriched based 
on a detriment to the other party, the court generally finds unjust 
enrichment.  The Court pronounced that the First Amendment does 
not protect deceitful or egregious conduct used to achieve a personal 
goal and it can be argued that Svenson’s conduct was deceitful.135  In 
a situation when one party is unjustly enriched due to an invasion of 
privacy, federal courts are more willing to find in favor of an 
individual’s right to privacy.136  The question becomes whether 
Svenson was unjustly enriched through the use of the Fosters’ 
images.  Similar to the plaintiff in Zacchini, the Fosters did not 
consent to the use of their children’s images.  Furthermore, it can be 
argued that Svenson was unjustly enriched and benefited from the use 
of the Fosters’ photographs.  The law as it exists protects individuals 
 
130 Id. at 567.  
131 Id. at 576-78.  The goals of patent and copyright law are to avoid unjust enrichment by 
recognizing the reward to the owner. Id. 
132 Id. at 573. 
133 Id.  
134 Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 574-76.   
135 Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 574. 
136 Id.  
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from being unjustly enriched.  However, this remedy would not solve 
the problem in Foster v. Svenson.  If the Fosters wanted 
compensation for the use of their image, the court could have 
awarded damages based on the right of publicity.137 The right of 
publicity grants a public figure compensation when his or her name, 
likeness, or image is used for a commercial purpose to sell or endorse 
a product.138  However, the Foster family was not looking for 
compensation nor did they give consent to use their images.  Instead, 
the Fosters wanted protection within their home and freedom from 
the intrusion of the press.  
In Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that First Amendment 
protection is not granted to a publication that is used for purpose of 
trade.139  Were Svenson’s photographs obtained solely to promote his 
exhibit and the sale of his work?  The Fosters claimed that the 
photographs were used for the “purpose of trade” and therefore were 
not entitled to First Amendment freedom of expression.  
In Titan Sports,  the court set forth the “incidental use” test to 
determine if a publication was considered used for the purpose of 
trade according to the statute.140  World Wrestling Federation, also 
known as Titan Sports, Inc. (“Titan”), owned all publicity rights 
concerning the wrestlers’ likenesses.141  Titan sold licenses to third 
parties that wished to make products that bore the wrestlers’ names 
and likenesses.142  The suit was brought against the publishing 
company for publication of a magazine, which included full size 
posters of the wrestlers without their consent or without obtaining a 
license from Titan.143  The United States District Court for the 
 
137 Id. at 573. 
138 White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
139 Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).  Titan agreed 
that the photographs were used for advertising purposes; the issue was whether they were 
used for the “purpose of trade.” Id.  The Titan court said, “The fact-finder should consider a 
variety of factors to determine the purpose of trade, including but not limited to the nature of 
the item, the extent of its relationship to the traditional content of a magazine, the ease with 
which it may be detached from the magazine, whether it is suitable for use as a separate 
product once detached, and how the publisher markets the item.” Id.  
140 Id. at 87-89. 
141 Id. at 87. 
142 Id.  
143  Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989). “The disputed 
photographs are printed in full color on pages four times as large as the pages comprising the 
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Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the 
publisher on the basis that the magazine is a newsstand publication 
and therefore the magazine together with the posters stapled within 
the magazine are entitled to full First Amendment protection.144  In 
contrast, the Court of Appeals found that there was an issue of fact as 
to whether these posters were used for the purpose of trade.145  The 
issue before the court in Titan Sports was whether the posters 
displaying the wrestlers’ images were entitled to First Amendment 
protection because of their placement in a magazine, or instead, not 
entitled to First Amendment protection because they were used solely 
to promote the sale of the magazine.  The court distinguished 
between classic public interest as displayed in Cox, and public 
interest that is “merely incidental to its commercial use” and 
therefore not protected by the First Amendment.146  Unlike Cox, 
incidental commercial use exists when there is an insignificant public 
interest aspect of the publication but the primary function is 
commercial.147  In this instance it seems the court agreed that the 
publication should not enjoy First Amendment protection because the 
posters’ placement within the magazine was seen as a mere avenue to 
promote Comics World sales.148  The Second Circuit stated, “[C]ourts 
have recognized that presentation of an item within a publication 
generally entitled to First Amendment protection may constitute a use 
for purposes of trade, which is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection.”149  Since there was a question of fact as to the purpose of 
the posters, the court reversed the summary judgment and remanded 
the case to the district court noting, “[I]t seems clear that photographs 
marketed as posters are used for the purposes of trade” in which case 
they will not be protected by the First Amendment.150  
 
balance of the Comic World publications. Up to ten of these photographs are folded and 
stapled into the center of each publication so that they may not be viewed it their entirety 
unless unstapled and removed. The blurb ‘10 FULL COLOR WRESTLING POSTERS! 
HUGE SIZE!’ or some variation of this theme appears on the cover of Comics World’s 
publication.”  Id. 
144 Titan Sports, Inc. 870 F.2d at 85. 




149 Titan Sports, Inc. 870 F.2d at 85. 
150 Id. at 88.  The court did not discuss how the photographs were taken.  Id.  
20
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Do the actual photographs of the Foster children have any 
significant public interest aspect?  There are certainly arguments for 
both sides of this query.  On one hand, the exhibit itself creates a 
commercial interest in the Foster children by depicting them in a 
manner which speaks to social norms and artistic meaning.  In Titan 
Sports, there was a question of fact as to whether the photographs of 
Titan wrestlers had a commercial interest because they were used to 
encourage the sale of a magazine.151  The photographs of the Titan 
Wrestlers were placed in a magazine for sale and the photographs of 
the Foster children were placed in an art exhibit for sale.  The 
difference between Svenson’s use and Titan Sports’ use of the 
photographs is minor—both commercial. However, once the 
photographs are deemed “artwork,” the public interest increases and 
the commercial interest decreases.  For example, before the creation 
of the exhibit, the Foster children had little commercial interest as 
they were not public figures or personalities.  Svenson’s exhibit in 
effect created a public interest in the images. 
 Is classifying the individual photographs “art” incidental to 
the underlying purpose--to promote the commercial sale of the name 
and likeness of the Fosters?  The court in Foster said no, and did not 
apply the incidental use test adopted by the federal courts.  If the 
court did apply the incidental use test, the court would have found the 
images to be merely an avenue to produce sales for Svenson and thus 
deem the photographs a commercial use prohibited by the statute.  
Instead, the court in Foster held that Svenson’s photographs were 
considered works of art, and any advertising in connection with the 
photographs was permissible.  Counsel for the Fosters argued that the 
images were exploited to both advertise the photograph collection 
and the retail outlets exhibiting them.  The court found that the 
primary purpose of Svenson’s photographs was to promote creativity 
and any profit that subsequently resulted was ancillary to the main 
function of the artwork.  While this is true, this determination does 
not resolve the issue which is whether an artist may use another 
person’s image and classify it as art when that image was obtained in 
an intrusive manner.  The current rubric of the New York Civil 
Rights Law is outdated because it only addresses issues regarding the 
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whether Svenson’s photographs were used for the purpose of trade or 
advertising but should include whether the photographs violated a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the photographs were 
obtained in a manner that intruded on an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  The current New York statute only covers the 
unauthorized use of an individual’s image for a commercial purpose.  
Here, defendant made an unauthorized use of an individual’s image 
obtained in a manner which should be deemed unlawful.  
A. The Federal Approach Applied to Foster 
Similar to the magazine in Titan Sports, which enjoyed First 
Amendment protection, Svenson’s exhibit entitled “The Neighbors” 
is artwork, which generally enjoys the fundamental protection of the 
First Amendment.  If the court in Foster were to apply the incidental 
use test, the question becomes:  Should the actual photographs 
captured by Svenson’s camera be protected by the freedom of 
expression because they are assembled together in an exhibit titled 
“the Neighbors” and called “artwork”?  What if an accountant rather 
than an artist took and sold the photographs? Would those 
photographs still be considered art?  
The federal approach recognizes that the publication of 
people’s images can be “characterized as having several possible 
purposes—they may inform the public [as in Cox], they may 
entertain [as in Zacchini], or they may be designed to sell a product, 
and thus be essentially commercial in nature [as in Titan Sports].”152  
If the publication is “essentially commercial in nature” the federal 
courts will not grant First Amendment protection.153  However, the 
court in Foster rejected the latter two purposes exemplified in 
Zacchini and Titan Sports.  The court refused to find that the 
photographs were used for a commercial purpose and rejected the 
idea that Svenson was unjustly enriched.154  Thus, similar to the result 
in Cox, the court held that the First Amendment extends to Svenson’s 
artwork since it was viewed as a publication meant to inform the 
public.155  In other words, the First Amendment’s protections trump 
 
152 Supra note 120. 
153 Titan Sports, Inc. 870 F.2d at 85. 
154 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
155 Id.  
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an individual’s right of privacy.  If the court in Svenson were to adopt 
the federal approach in Titan Sports that the photographs were merely 
incidental to the commercial use of the Fosters’ images, First 
Amendment protection would not apply.  However, the court held 
that the money made from selling artwork is not considered a 
commercial use and stated that “[t]he value of artistic expression 
outweighs any sale that stems from the published photos.”156 
It can be argued that the way in which the Fosters’ 
photographs were obtained separates them from the classic type of 
artwork. The method in which the photographs were taken is what 
disturbed the Fosters.157  Svenson is not the only artist who has 
produced surveillance photography.  Artist Michele Iversen created a 
series of photographs called Night Surveillance.158  She stated:  
As a photographer, I choose to reveal aspects of 
human nature that were previously hidden from view.  
These unknown images are constructed from real life.  
I use the camera as a tool to objectively document and 
create intimate discoveries through both systematic 
and chance shooting. 
  
In the Night Surveillance Series, I have cautiously and 
randomly photographed people inside of their homes 
through windows . . . witnessing curious behaviors. 
Surveillance is an important element for me.  I 
fearfully wait for an image to record, and to steal the 
privacy of the subject separated only by a window of 
glass.  These images are motivated by fear.  I am 
afraid to be seen, afraid to watch at the very same 
moment I determine when to suspend a stranger’s 
privacy.  I feel stimulation from the violation imposed 
upon the unknowingly compliant subjects.  An intense 
aesthetic/erotic friction occurs.  However, I am 
 
156 Id. at 104. 
157 Complaint at 17. 
158 Night Surveillance Series, MICHELE IVERSON, http://micheleiversen.com/nsseries.html 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
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compelled to make these images and to expose the 
voyeuristic tendencies inherent in human culture.159 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that Svenson’s and 
Iversen’s surveillance would offend most people.  It is clear why 
Judge Rakower called upon the New York legislature to revisit this 
issue.  Surveillance photography reveals intimate moments which 
may intrude on an individual’s realm of privacy.  The court in Foster 
stated that while Svenson’s actions are indeed considered an intrusion 
into the home, they do not rise to the level of “atrocious, indecent and 
utterly despicable” and concluded there is no viable cause of action 
for invasion of privacy.160 
 Another issue presented by Foster v. Svenson is the status of 
surveillance photography as art.  Surveillance photography is not an 
original work of art created on a canvas with paint.  Instead, it is 
merely a snapshot of a moment in time.  Under the copyright laws a 
minimal degree of creativity is required to secure copyright 
protection.161  Similar to the copyright law, the right of publicity is 
based on the doctrine of fair use.  Simply stated, the doctrine of fair 
use allows individuals to use materials that are protected by copyright 
if that use is transformative and does not negatively affect the market 
for the original work.162  In the case of Foster v. Svenson, would there 
be more or less artistic originality if instead Svenson painted the 
Foster children in a lifelike manner?  Is there more creative skill 
involved in a painting than taking a photograph?  While many 
photographs are considered art, the question becomes how much 
originality is required before the photograph evolves from “stalking” 
to “artwork”?  The courts, however, have refused to define what is 
considered art.163  
Nevertheless, the right of publicity is an intellectual property 
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or 
her identity.164  In New York, the photograph at issue in Foster 
contains a type of property right--the Foster children’s image and 
likeness which the right of publicity should protect.  In an attempt to 
 
159 Id.  
160 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 105 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
161 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 207 (2012). 
162 Appropriated Moments, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103 (2015). 
163 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
164 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003).  
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reconcile the dubious gaps in privacy law, one may argue that the 
photographs should be considered used for a commercial purpose 
because they incorporate not just artistic creation, but the subjects’ 
property, their right of publicity.  If the Foster children wanted to 
claim that their right of publicity was violated they would also have 
to prove that they, and therefore Svenson, had commercial value in 
their image and likeness.  Ironically, a New York federal court was 
the first to acknowledge an individual’s right of publicity.165  
However the only right of publicity accepted by the New York courts 
is encompassed within New York’s Civil Rights Law. 
V. NEW YORK’S RIGHT OF PRIVACY STATUTE  
New York’s right of privacy is set forth in New York Civil 
Rights Law sections 50 and 51, which prohibit the unauthorized and 
commercial use of a person’s likeness.166  Penal in nature, section 50 
provides that it is a misdemeanor, whereas section 51 provides 
injunctive relief for a violation of the statute.167  However, New 
York’s statutory right of privacy is not absolute.168  In order to 
maintain a balance between the right of privacy and the New York 
Constitution, the legislature engrafted exceptions within the language 
of the statute.169  New York courts adopt a narrow meaning of the 
terms “advertising and trade.”170  This narrow interpretation 
essentially decreases the scope of protection afforded by the 
statute.171  Similar to the federal approach, the New York Court of 
Appeals adopted the newsworthy exception and applied it liberally.172  
 
165 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); 
Leonard M. Marks & Robert P. Mulvey, Celebrity Rights Law Needed in New York 4, N.Y. 
L.J. (Nov. 6, 1995) (stating that in Haelan, the federal courts of New York were the first to 
recognize an independent common law right protecting plaintiffs’ economic interests).  
166 See supra note 7.  
167 See supra note 7. 
168 Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 360 (N.Y. 1952). 
169 Jaime Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 2000) (“A Civil 
Rights Law claim may lie [only] if (1) a plaintiff’s picture is used purely for trade purposes, 
and (2) not in connection with a newsworthy article.”). Id. at 550. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See supra Part III for a discussion on the two limitations to the newsworthy exception; 
see also Finger v. Omni, 77 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990) (explaining that questions of 
‘newsworthiness’ are better left to reasonable editorial judgment and discretion; judicial 
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Therefore, even though New York grants a so-called statutory right 
of privacy, the courts apply the statute only in limited circumstances 
to promote legislative intent.   
The New York legislature enacted sections 50 and 51 in 
response to the decision in Roberson v. Rochester.173  The defendant, 
a company in the business of manufacturing and selling white flour, 
created and circulated 25,000 lithographic prints of the plaintiff’s 
likeness for the purpose of profit and personal gain.174  The prints 
showed the plaintiff’s face, together with the company’s name, 
manufacturer, and logo.175  The advertisement was displayed in 
stores, warehouses, and public places specifically in the area where 
the plaintiff resided, as well as in other areas of the United States and 
abroad.176  The plaintiff sustained humiliation and shock from the 
public display of her image.177  The Court of Appeals of New York 
held the right of privacy is a non-actionable right because it is “purely 
sentimental” in character. 178  As a result, defendant’s flour company 
was unjustly enriched by the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s 
photograph.179  The unfairness of the decision prompted an outcry 
from the public over the unauthorized use of plaintiff’s photograph 
and emphasized the need for the authority to afford protection for an 
individual’s privacy.180   
In the Foster decision, the court asked the legislative body to 
consider the creation of a statute that would prohibit the use of a 
person’s image without his or her consent solely for the furtherance 
of his own personal benefit.181  The New York State legislature was 
the first to recognize a statutory right of privacy founded on the belief 
 
intervention should occur only in those instances where there is ‘no real relationship’ 
between a photograph and an article or where the article is an ‘advertisement in disguise.’). 
173 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id.  
177 Id. 
178 Roberson, 64 N.E.2d at 544 (The Court of Appeals of New York was hesitant that if a 
plaintiff had a right of privacy to his own likeness, there would be a vast amount of “absurd” 
litigation.). Id. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. 
181 Id. “Needless to say, as illustrated by the troubling facts here, in these times of 
heightened threats to privacy posed by new and ever more invasive technologies, we call 
upon the Legislature to revisit this important issue, as we are constrained to apply the law as 
it exists.” Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 106 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
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that “a man has a right to pass through the world without having his 
picture published.”182  In 1903, the New York legislature enacted 
sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law to rectify the 
negative result in Roberson.183  The privacy statute was drafted to 
apply specifically in situations similar to Roberson, which concern 
only the commercial use of a photograph.184  
A. The New York Approach 
It is well established that when a publication causes tension 
between privacy and free speech, New York’s privacy statute asks 
whether the specific publication falls in either the category of 
“advertising or trade” or in the “newsworthy exception.”185  As 
exemplified in the cases discussed below, these categories are 
ambiguous and have resulted in different interpretations.  However, 
the common consensus of New York courts has been to limit granting 
protection under sections 50 and 51.  
In Arrington v. New York Times, the court determined the 
meaning of “trade” proscribed by the statute.186  The Arrington test 
ignores the motive for creating the work, and instead focuses on the 
underlying nature of the work itself.187  If the nature of the work itself 
is newsworthy, then it is not considered used “for the purpose of 
trade.”188  Since the enactment of the privacy statute in 1903, courts 
have held that the fact that a publication is produced for profit or 
even that a picture is included in the publication for the sole purpose 
of increasing profit, does not constitute a “use for trade.”189  Further, 
the statute does not define the term “advertising,” but the court in 
Flores v. Monler stated that advertising has been understood to mean 
“a use in, or as part of, an advertisement or solicitation for 
 
182 Supra note 76; see also Right to Privacy, supra note 2, at 195. 
183 See supra note 76 at 908.  
184 Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982) (“It is 
noteworthy, therefore, that, while concern engendered by this decision prompted the 
Legislature to enact sections 50 and 51, these were drafted narrowly to encompass only the 
commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness and no more.”). 
185  See supra Part V. 
186 Arrington v. New York Times, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1329 (N.Y. 1982). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580; Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.E.2d at 359; Arrington v. 
New York Times, 434 N.E.2d at 1329. 
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patronage.”190  As exemplified in this Note, the precise meaning of 
these terms caused uncertainty in the case of Foster v. Svenson.   
In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals in Stephano v. News 
Group explained that any publication concerning a matter of public 
interest cannot be considered used for the purpose of trade or 
advertising.191  In Stephano, a professional model sued a publishing 
company for displaying an image of her modeling a bomber jacket in 
a magazine without her consent.192  The image was displayed 
alongside an article in New York magazine with information about 
new products available in the area and described the bomber jacket as 
a “cotton-twill version with ‘fun fur’ collar features the same cut at a 
far lower price––about $225.  It’ll be available in the stores next 
week.”193   
The New York County Supreme Court granted judgment for 
the defendant reasoning that the article informed the public about the 
fashion industry, and therefore the newsworthy exception applied.194  
The Appellate Division of the First Department disagreed with the 
lower court’s reasoning and reversed in favor of the model.195  The 
First Department said that any rational person would conclude that 
the publishing company used the image for the purpose of advertising 
its product.196   
However, the New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the 
First Department and found that the statute should not only apply to 
matters of public concern, such as political news and social trends, 
but also to articles that offer information to consumers.197  In 
Stephano, the court held that the plaintiff’s photograph was a public 
interest protected by the newsworthy exception because the model’s 
image was used to convey the availability of a new clothing item.198 
Regardless of the existence of advertising and trade in 
Stephano, due to the use of a model’s image in order to display the 
 
190 Flores v. Monler, 7 N.Y.2d 276 (1959). 
191 Stephano v. News Group Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984). 
192 Id. at 581. 
193 Id. at 582. 
194 Id. at 585-87. 
195 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580. The First Department decided Foster v. Svenson in the 
contrary. See discussion supra Part III.  
196 Id. 
197 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580. 
198 Id.  
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clothing to consumers, the court reasoned that the fashion industry is 
a mode of public interest.199  In other words, a consumer would 
consider the image an advertisement.  It is inherent in the nature of a 
publication that it produces profit, but such motive is not the 
determining factor in deciding newsworthiness.  Instead, it is the 
content of the article itself that is considered newsworthy.200  The 
Court of Appeals’ holding in Stephano illustrates the broad 
application of the newsworthy exception, finding that it applies not 
only to classic news reports such as political happenings and social 
trends, but also to fashion articles aimed towards interested and 
paying consumers.201  This decision applies the newsworthy 
exception broadly to include even articles of consumer interests 
including developments in the fashion world.202 
B. The New York Approach Applied to Artwork 
The issue of whether the statute should exempt an artistic 
expression would be an issue of first impression for the New York 
Court of Appeals.  However, some lower court decisions demonstrate 
that an artistic expression falls outside the confines of the statute203 
and have facilitated the distinction between privacy law and artistic 
expression. 
 In 1993, the Civil Court of New York in Simeonov v. Tiegs 
held that an artist could portray a person’s likeness without written 
consent and sell some limited number without violating the statute.204  
An Appellate Term, First Department order left open the question of 
whether the defendant’s actions constituted “trade” and were 
therefore prohibited by the statute.205  The suit arose out of a dispute 
between an artist and his model.  Artist Mihail Simeonov created a 
 
199 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580. 
200 Id. 
201 See Finger, 77 N.Y.2d at 143 (explaining that classic news is not the only type of 
speech protected by the newsworthy exception); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (stating that “[t]here is no doubt that 
entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.”). 
202 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580. 
203 Altbach v. Kulon, 754 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2003); Nusseenzweig v. 
Dicorcia, 832 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007); Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 
1014 (Sup. Ct. 1993). 
204 Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.   
205 Id. 
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plaster casting of the head of a fashion model Cheryl Tiegs.  
Although Simeonov had Tiegs’ consent to create the plaster castings 
of her head, he did not have consent to produce a modified cast 
created from the original cast.  Simeonov intended to make ten 
bronze copies of the mask and sell them for $20,000 each.206  
However, he never got the chance to do so because a maintenance 
worker accidentally broke the mask beyond repair.207  Simeonov sued 
Tiegs to recover the money he intended to make from the masks.  
Tiegs claimed as a defense that Simeonov never had permission to 
make the modified casts and argued that Simeonov’s creation of the 
plaster mask violated New York’s Civil Rights statute because he 
used her image without her consent for the purpose of trade or 
advertising.208  Tiegs alleged that Simeonov’s reproduction of her 
likeness harmed her because she did not want her image circulated.  
The court held that an artist can create a work of art that includes a 
person’s likeness and sell a limited number of copies without consent 
and without violating the New York Civil Rights statute.  
The court reasoned that by their very nature, works of art are 
created for the purpose of human expression, not for purpose of trade, 
and asked why can only a limited amount be sold?209  The fact that 
profit is subsequently derived is not a determination of commercial 
use.210  If the nature of the work is considered a matter of public 
interest as in Stephano, the Court of Appeals of New York has 
consistently held that the statute does not apply because the work is 
not being produced for advertising or trade, as long as only a limited 
number of copies is sold.  This raises the question --where should the 
court draw the line on that limitation?  The fact that there is no direct 
answer to this question is one reason why New York Civil Rights 
Law should be amended. Simeonov correctly applied the rule of law 
stated in Stephano—the motivation to raise profit is not the only 
factor in the determination of whether a work was used for trade; it is 




208 Id.  
209 Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.  
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 1018.  
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Ten years after Simeonov, the Third Department of the New 
York State Supreme Court Appellate Division provided clarification 
in Altbach v. Kulon and held that if a painting constitutes a parody, it 
is considered an artistic expression exempt from the statute.212  In 
Altbach, an artist created an oil painting depicting a caricature of a 
local Town Justice with devil’s horns.213  When the Town Justice 
sued, the Supreme Court granted an injunction prohibiting the artist 
from displaying the image.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
imposed a $3,850 fine for the violation of the injunction when a 
newspaper featured a photograph of the artist holding up the 
painting.214  The Third Department affirmed the Supreme Court’s 
decision  and concluded that even the newspaper article displaying 
the name and photograph of the Justice is ancillary to the painting 
because it helped to communicate a message through an artistic 
expression.215  The court found that both the oil painting and the 
image in the newspaper were “part and parcel” of a parody.216  This 
decision stands for the possibility of an additional exception carved 
out by the majority of New York courts--that the unauthorized use of 
a photograph may fall outside the reach of the statute if there is a 
message or transformative element added to the photograph.217  The 
court found that the newsworthy exception did not apply in this case 
because of the exception for works of art which states that any 
advertising done in connection with such works is protected by the 
First Amendment.218 
VI. CALIFORNIA’S RIGHT OF PRIVACY STATUTE  
The deficiency of the New York’s Civil Rights Statute is 
illustrated by a comparison with the privacy laws in other states.  In 
an influential article, Dean Prosser outlined four different types of 
 
212 Altbach, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 657. 
213 Id. at 655. 
214 Id. at 657. 
215 Id. at 658-59. 
216 Id.  
217 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (“For purposes of 
determining whether parody of copyrighted work is “fair use,” inquiry focuses on whether 
new work merely supersedes object of original creation or whether and to what extent it is 
“transformative” and alters original work with new expression, meaning or message.”).  
218 Altbach, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 658. 
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privacy.219  The United States Court of Appeals stated that “the right 
of privacy and the right of publicity protect fundamentally different 
interests and must be analyzed separately.”220  The right of privacy 
generally protects the right to be let alone while the right of publicity 
protects a celebrity’s pecuniary interest in the commercial 
exploitation of his or her identity.221  California recognizes a statutory 
right of publicity, statutory right of privacy, and a common law right 
of publicity.222  The California right of privacy statute says that if an 
artist’s skills and talents are manifestly subordinate to the overall goal 
of creating a portrait that commercially exploits a celebrity’s fame, 
then the artist’s First Amendment right is outweighed by his right of 
publicity.  However, New York does not recognize a statutory right 
of publicity nor a common law right of privacy or publicity.223  
Furthermore, California’s privacy statute was recently amended to 
incorporate protection in visual images.  The privacy statute states: 
A person is liable for a physical invasion of privacy if 
the person knowingly commits an act of trespass in 
order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff 
“with the intent to capture any type of visual image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression of the 
plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity, 
and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive 
to a reasonable person.224  
A person is liable for a constructive invasion of 
privacy in these circumstances, regardless of whether 
there is a physical trespass, if the visual image, sound 
recording, or other physical impression could not have 
been achieved without a trespass unless a visual or 
auditory enhancing device was used.225  
Separate and apart from the right of publicity statute which 
deals with the commercial use of a person’s likeness, this privacy 
 
219 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (Am. Law Inst. 1977). 
220 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983). 
221 Id.  
222 ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, 
http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law/california, (2017). 
223 Id.  
224 (C.C. 1708.8(a).). 
225 (C.C. 1708.8(b).). 
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statute deals specifically with the type of conduct in Foster v. 
Svenson.  The statute specifically mentions that an invasion of 
privacy occurs if a person used a visual enhancing device to capture a 
visual image.  If applied to Foster v. Svenson, it is likely the court 
would find a constructive invasion of privacy due to Svenson’s use of 
a visual enhancing device to obtain the images.  For example, In 
Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc., the United States District Court in 
California stated that the elements for invasion of privacy are: (1) an 
intentional intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter (2) 
in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.226  If Svenson 
photographed the Fosters in California the application of this statute 
may have resulted in a different outcome for the Fosters.  The 
California right of privacy is not absolute; it must also be balanced 
against the public interest in the dissemination of news and 
information under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech 
and the press.227 
VII. BALANCING THE EQUITIES  
In the wrestling match between the freedom of speech and the 
right of privacy, New York and federal courts balance the equities 
and have reached different results.228  In the specific situation when 
an artist’s right to artistic expression is in tension with a person’s 
right to control his image, New York should adopt a new approach.  
The decision of Foster v. Svenson demonstrates the existence of a gap 
in New York’s privacy law, which fails to cover situations that may 
arise in the developing field of art and photography.  Photographers 
have had the ability to take photographs through unblocked windows 
for a long time and have not been faced with lawsuits.  Nevertheless, 
the court in Foster admits that the mere classification of “art” should 
 
226 551 F. Supp. 2d 1183.  To prevail on the first element, the plaintiff must show that he 
had a reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or data 
source. Medical Lab., 306 F.3d at 812–13.  In determining whether an alleged intrusion is 
“highly offensive” for purposes of the second element, relevant considerations include “the 
degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as 
well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the 
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded. Id.  
227  Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 228 (1953). 
228 See discussion supra Parts IV and V. 
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not protect the invasive manner in which such art is created.229  
However, in order to encourage artistic creation, the freedom of 
expression has consistently been afforded to individuals despite 
invasiveness.  Implementing a broader privacy statute may leave 
room for possible First Amendment issues although First Amendment 
rights do not completely abrogate the right of privacy.230  However, 
the New York courts seem to find just the opposite.  The New York 
approach has essentially swallowed the statute’s protection by 
applying the newsworthy exception in virtually every situation which 
implicates the First Amendment.  Simply put, the protection granted 
by the statute will not apply to artwork if the term “commercial 
purpose” does not apply to artwork.231  In contrast, a broader privacy 
statute must not violate the First Amendment.  Thus, the perfect 
balance between these equities have been established in the proposed 
amendment to sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law 
which is currently pending before the legislature.  
VIII. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO § § 50 AND 51 
The New York State Assembly proposed a legislation to 
amend the New York Civil Rights law in relation to capturing the 
visual image of a person in a dwelling.  The purpose of the 
amendment is specifically to prevent people from having their images 
taken within their homes.  The summary of the amendment’s 
provisions is as follows:  
Section 1 - Amends § 50 of the civil rights law to 
include a prohibition on knowingly capturing the 
image of another person within a dwelling, when that 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  A 
person in violation of this section will be guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
Section 2 - Amends § 51 of the civil rights law, 
allowing a person whose image is captured in 
 
229 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96. 
230 Id. at 475.  
231 Id.  
34
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/13
2017 HUMANS OF NEW YORK 991 
 
violation of § 50 to maintain an equitable action, and 
to also sue for any damages incurred.232 
In order for a more equitable result in situations where an 
artist’s First Amendment rights invade an individual’s privacy, New 
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 should be amended with 
this clear language.  The statute should be interpreted to adopt a 
balance between the government’s interest in encouraging artistic 
creation against the interest of protecting an individual’s right of 
privacy.  By implementing strict scrutiny this amendment addresses 
compelling governmental interests.  If the First Department were to 
apply this balance in Foster v. Svenson, the result could have been 
different for the Foster family.  For example, Svenson’s photographs 
can be considered artistic expression that should be protected by his 
First Amendment rights if they were obtained in a non-intrusive 
manner.  On the other side, this grant of freedom should not infringe 
other fundamental rights such as the right of privacy.  Svenson’s 
rights under the First Amendment should depend on the purpose for 
which the photographs are used and the means by which they are 
secured.  The court should balance these factors in determining this 
issue.233  The photographs are highly intrusive into the sacred corners 
of the Fosters’ home.  The images invade the privacy of the Fosters’ 
children.  In this case, a judge may find the balance of privacy 
interest of an individual child to outweigh an artist’s freedom to 
display these images to the public.  Under this solution, the court will 
maintain the legislative intent by protecting both the freedom of 
expression and the right of privacy.  The amendment will uphold both 
constitutional rights and privacy rights and will withstand 
constitutional scrutiny so long as it is narrowly tailored to deal 
strictly with the type of conduct it intends to remedy.  The directive 
to make no law “abridging the freedom of speech” is not absolute.  A 
statute may be enacted if it satisfies the government’s test of strict 
scrutiny.  The amendment will withstand strict scrutiny if its purpose 
 
232 See Amendment to N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. 
233 Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (confronting potentially 
conflicting privacy and free speech claims with long-standing doctrinal support, the Court 
balanced the relevant interests).  
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is to provide society with a reasonable expectation of privacy within 
their homes.234 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Over one hundred years ago, the famous Warren and Brandeis 
article suggested that the law must keep pace with the changing times 
and the progress of the human mind.235  This statement is even more 
true today.  Such progress of the human mind produces new 
technologies that change the way society conducts itself.  The camera 
first appeared in the 1820s and operated in commercial 
establishments with bulky equipment and complicated techniques.236  
Today, the camera is a portable device that anyone can use to capture 
an intimate moment with one snap of a button.  With the growth of 
modernistic art, such as surveillance photography, the New York 
legislature must also anticipate the growth of privacy concerns in this 
field.  Thus, the legislature should consider the surrounding 
circumstances when there is a conflict between privacy and the 
freedom to create art.   
Similar to the unfair result in Roberson, which prompted the 
creation of the statute, there is also an unfair result in Foster v. 
Svenson. This result should alert the legislature to the need to once 
again revisit privacy rights.  Due to the gap in the New York statute, 
the privacy of the Foster children was invaded with no avenue of 
judicial relief.  Perhaps this Note will encourage a new discussion on 
the issue of the right of privacy in our generation. 
 The increased complexity and intensity of modern 
civilization and the development of man’s spiritual 
sensibilities have rendered man more sensitive to 
publicity and have increased his need of privacy, 
while the great technological improvements in the 
means of communication have more and more 
subjected the intimacies of his private life to 
exploitation by those who pander to commercialism 
 
234  When a challenged action burdens a fundamental right, the standard is heightened 
scrutiny which will be upheld only if the government establishes a compelling justification.   
235 Right to Privacy, supra note 2. 
236 TODD GUSTAVASON, CAMERA: A HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY FROM DAGUERREOTYPE TO 
DIGITAL 2-4 (2009).  
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and to prurient and idle curiosity.  A legally 
enforceable right of privacy is deemed to be proper 
protection against this type of encroachment upon the 






237 Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273 (1952). 
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